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The failure of many savings and loan institutions in the 1980s bankrupted
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), forcing the
FSLIC to rely on massive federal subsidies. A similar crisis subsequently struck
the banking system, and it now appears that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) will also go bankrupt and require taxpayer subsidies. The
vast expense of these bailouts has focused the attention of policymakers and
the public on reducing the risk exposure of the federal deposit insurance
system. In response to this crisis, the U.S. Treasury issued a report in 1991 in
which it made specific proposals for reforming deposit insurance. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) incorporat-
ed some of the Treasury Department's proposals. One controversial element
of the FDICIA is a plan for reforming the deposit insurance system by shifting
some of the risk of bank failures from the federal insurance fund to depositors
themselves. This proposal rests on the premise that depositors who bear some
of the risk of bank failure are likely to discipline weak institutions by threaten-
ing to withdraw their deposits. In this Article, Professor Mantripragada discuss-
es the costs and benefits of depositor discipline and assesses the Treasury
proposals and FDICIA provisions that are designed to promote depositor disci-
pline. The author suggests that a maturity-based coverage limit would be
preferable to the dollar-based limit retained by the Act.
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Introduction
The federal deposit insurance program began in 1934 with the establishment
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure deposits in
commercial banks and mutual savings banks, and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to insure deposits in savings and loan associa-
tions. From that time, the program has successfully met its basic goals of
protecting the small depositor, ensuring the stability of the banking system by
eliminating bank runs, and providing a safe transaction asset for the economy.
For most of its history, the program was financed entirely by insured depository
institutions which paid premiums based on their total domestic deposits. In
recent years, however, the program has encountered serious financial difficul-
ties, requiring massive taxpayer subsidies and causing an unexpected shift of
costs from insured institutions to taxpayers. The FSLIC's insurance fund, which
had a balance of $6.46 billion in 1980, became bankrupt in 1986 and showed
negative balances of $6.33 billion in 1986 and $13.69 billion in 1987. Similarly,
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the ratio of the fund to insured deposits declined from 1.28% in 1980 to -0.71%
in 1986 and -1.47% in 1987.' The bankruptcy of the FSLIC led to the enact-
ment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) .of 1989.2 The savings and loan bailout plan under FIRREA was
initially expected to cost the taxpayers about $166 billion.3 The cost estimates
keep going up, however, and the actual cost will not be known until all the
assets of the failed institutions are sold.
When Congress enacted FIRREA, the financial problems seemed to be
confined to the savings and loan industry and the fund insuring its deposits. At
that time, analysts thought the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) was finan-
cially strong. Subsequently, financial problems engulfed the BIF as well.' The
fund, which had a balance of $18.30 billion at the end of 1987, declined to
$13.21 billion by the end of 1989.1 In 1990, for the third consecutive year, the
fund is expected to incur a loss, currently estimated at $3 billion.6 The ratio
of the fund to insured deposits has steadily declined since 1983. The ratio
reached the statutory minimum level of 1.10%7 in 1987 and a still lower level
of 0.70% in 1989.' Moreover, it is expected to decline even further and reach
1. FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD, 1987 ANN. REP. 8 (1988).
2. Financial Institutions Refonn, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1989)) [hereinafter FIRREAJ.
3. This is the official cost estimate given when FIRREA was enacted in August 1989 and includes
interest costs on borrowed funds over a ten-year period. Cost estimates different from the $166 billion are
given by the Office of the Management and Budget, and by the General Accounting Office. The divergence
of opinion about the estimates of costs to taxpayers is due to differences regarding the period over which
the interest costs are computed, methods of estimating the costs (present value basis or not), and assump-
tions about the performance of the economy and the thrift industry. See THOMAS F. CARGILL, MONEY, THE
FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND MONETARY PoucY 317-18 (1991). While the actual cost to the taxpayers will
not be known until all the assets of the failed institutions are disposed of, there is no doubt that the cost
will be quite substantial. The Bush Administration has said recently that it needs an additional $80 billion
for resolving the savings and loan (S&L) failures-a figure considered by some to be a conservative
estimate. See Paulette Thomas, Bush Administration Lets Out Seams on its Projections for Thrift Bailout,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 1991, at A3.
4. See Kenneth H. Bacon, FDIC Says Insurance Fund Will Shrink to $4 Billion in '91 Without an
Infusion, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1990, at A7; Paulette Thomas, FDIC Increases Loss Projection to $3 Billion,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1990, at 'A2 [hereinafter Thomas, FDIC Increases Loss Projection to $3 Billion];
Paulette Thomas, Seidman Raises Estimate of Size of FDIC Deficit, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1991, at A2.
5. FED. DEPOsrr INS. CORP., 1989 ANN. REP. 114 (1989) [hereinafter FDIC 1989 REPORTI.
6. Since the 1991 annual report of the FDIC will not be available until the middle of 1992, and the
1990 annual report has not been made public as of this writing, official figures about FDIC balances in
the insurance funds and the ratios of insurance fund to insured deposits for years subsequent to 1989 are
not available. Hence only estimated figures r eported in the financial press are provided here.
7. This was the statutory level prescribed before the passage of FIRREA. Under FIRREA, the level
of the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Association Insurance Fund shall be 1.25% of the insured
deposits or such higher percentage of estimated insured deposits, not exceeding 1.5%, as the Board of
Directors of the FDIC determine. See FIRREA § 2.08.
8. See FDIC 1989 REPORT, supra note 5, at 114. The FDIC is required to give assessment credits to
member depositories of an insurance fund if it expects the reserve ratio to exceed the designated level. This
is to be done by reducing the assessed premiums to the members for the subsequent year. However, there
are no specific penalties for letting the ratio go below the statutory level. When this happens, the FDIC
is normally required to raise the assessment to member institutions for subsequent years to a level sufficient
to restore the ratio to the statutory level. However, both the banking industry and the savings and loan
industry have not been in robust financial health in recent years, and therefore could not absorb the increases
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a record low of 0.5% in 1990.' A reversal of this trend is not expected in the
near future, and analysts expect the fund to have a sizeable deficit by the end
of 1992. According to one estimate, the bank failure costs to the BIF over the
period from 1991 to 1993 will range from $17 billion to $63 billion, with an
estimated premium income of $28 to $31 billion.'"
There are actually two separate objectives in the federal deposit insurance
program reform efforts. The first, and most immediate, is to restore a positive
balance in the Bank Insurance Fund. The second, long-term objective is to
institute structural changes which will ensure that another massive taxpayer
bailout is never needed. There are several methods which might be used to
achieve this long-term objective, including risk-related insurance premiums,
improving the risk-based capital standards, privatization of deposit insurance,
implementation of market-value accounting, and exposing depositors to potential
losses (depositor monitoring or depositor discipline)."
In February 1991, the Department of the Treasury submitted a report
presenting its plan for modernizing the U.S. financial system. 2 The report
included proposals for reforming the federal deposit insurance program, some
of which were incorporated in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. The Treasury report and the FDICIA give
depositor monitoring an important role in reforming the deposit insurance
program.
This Article presents a comprehensive analysis of depositor monitoring,
focusing on the provisions of the FDICIA. The Article criticizes the idea Of
dollar-based coverage, and then examines the strengths and weaknesses of an
alternative system using maturity-based coverage. Part I of this article presents
a brief review of the factors which contributed to the financial problems of the
federal deposit insurance program. Part II explains the rationale for depositor
discipline and discusses reasons for its past ineffectiveness. Part III presents
different methods of promoting depositor monitoring, followed by a discussion
of the conditions for effective functioning of depositor discipline and the
problems in ensuring these conditions. Part IV analyzes the Treasury proposals
and the provisions of the FDICIA for promoting depositor discipline. Finally,
in assessment rates which would be required to bring the ratio to the statutory level. Hence, the premium
increases have been moderate and have been influenced by what the industry can bear. This resulted in
a policy of letting the ratio drop below the statutory level in recent years. The goal remains restoration of
the ratio to the statutory level as soon as the financial health of the industry will permit.
9. See Thomas, FDIC Increases Loss Projection to $3 Billion, supra note 4.
10. See JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 101ST
CONG., 2D SESS., BANKING INDUSTRY IN TURMOIL: A REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF THE U.S. BANKING
INDUSTRY AND THE BANK INSURANCE FUND 6-7 (Comm.Print 1990).
11. See G.J. BENSTON ET AL., PERSPECTIViS ON SAFE & SOUND BANKING: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURE (1986).
12. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991).
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Part V offers a maturity-based deposit coverage limit as an alternative to the
current dollar-based limit. 3
I. Factors Responsible for Deposit Insurance Losses
Any attempt to reform the federal deposit insurance program must begin
by analyzing the factors which led to the present debacle. In large measure,
these factors were not exogenous events but were, rather, shortcomings in the
federal deposit insurance program itself. These shortcomings may be classified
as defects in the system and defects in its supervisory and regulatory practices.
A. Defects in the Design of Federal Deposit Insurance
Since the defects in the design of federal deposit insurance are well docu-
mented elsewhere 4 , they need not be discussed here in great detail. Briefly, the
defects include the possible underpricing of federal deposit insurance, inequity
and moral hazard associated with the flat rate premiums, and the absence of
any built-in safeguards to protect the insurer.
1. Possible Underpricing of Federal Deposit Insurance
Some writers on the subject suggest that federal deposit insurance is under-
priced. 5 The bankruptcy of the FSLIC in 1986 and the depletion of the
FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund lend powerful support to this view. Kane' 6
argued that the reported size of the insurance fund is likely to be overstated if
certain costs, including all the contingent liabilities against the fund from
possible future failures, are not properly accounted for. He also argued 7 that
the insurance system provides free coverage for unfamiliar types of risk-taking
whose costs are not likely to be properly reflected in the premiums assessed.
Also, since coverage by an insurance agency imposes indirect costs of various
13. In this Article, the terms depositor discipline, depositor-imposed discipline, depositor-induced
discipline, and depositor monitoring are used interchangeably.
14. See, e.g., Laurie S. Goodman & Sherrill Shaffer, The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical
Evaluation of Proposed Reforms, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 145 (1984); EDWARD J. KANE, THE GATHERING CRISIS
IN FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE (1985) [hereinafter KANE, GATHERING CRISIS]; EDWARD J. KANE, THE
S&L INSURANCE MESS: How DID IT HAPPEN? (1989); GEORGE J. BENSTON & .GEORGE G. KAUFMAN,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO, RISK AND SOLVENCY REGULATION OF DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS:
PAST POLICIES AND CURRENT OPTIONS (1988).
15. See John H. Kareken & Neil Wallace, Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial Equilibri-
um Exposition, 51 J. Bus. 413 (1978); KANE, supra note 14, at 114-17; Robert C. Merton, On the Cost of
Deposit Insurance When There are Surveillance Costs, 51 J. Bus. 439 (1978); William F. Sharpe, Bank
Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 701 (1978);
Steven A. Buser et al., Federal Deposit Insurance, Regulatory Policy, and Optimal Bank Capital, 35 J. FIN.
51 (1981).
16. See KANE, GATHERING CRISIS. supra note 14, at 52-53.
17. Id. at 62-66.
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types (costs of complying with the regulations) on the insured institutions, the
explicit premiums have to be set lower. Another argument runs as follows. Only
the federally-chartered depository institutions are required by their charters to
be insured by the federal deposit insurance system; it is voluntary for the state-
chartered institutions. In order to maximize any social benefits of deposit
insurance, premiums have to be set lower than the fair market level to induce
the state-chartered institutions to participate voluntarily. Only such a policy
would encourage those institutions to join the insurance system.'l Since many
state-chartered depository institutions have opted for federal deposit insurance,
it may be argued that the system has provided -underpriced insurance.
2. Inequity or Unfairness of Flat Rate Premiums
Under the flat rate system, the same premium rate is charged to all the
insured institutions irrespective of the differences in risk. The flat rate structure
is not equitable for all the insured.19 The inequity is that the flat rate system
subsidizes the more risky institutions at the expense of the more conservatively
managed institutions. In fact, the greater the risk assumed by an insured
institution, the greater the value of the subsidy to it.
3. The Moral Hazard Problem
There is also a moral hazard problem associated with the flat rate system.2'
Moral hazard refers to the propensity of the insured institutions to disregard
the risk consequences of their actions, if the costs of such actions are shifted
to the insurer. This problem arises when actions of the insured that increase
either the probability or the size of the losses to the insurer have no bearing
on the premiums the insured pays. It is important to note that we are talking
about the explicit premium rates. If implicit costs such as those associated with
regulatory restrictions, stricter compliance, and more frequent examinations of
problem institutions are also taken into account, it is possible that more risky
institutions do pay more non-premium costs. While more stringent and frequent
inspections and additional compliance costs can impose implicit costs that differ
from one institution to the other, mechanism do not exist to ensure that such
differences are fair or consistent. Moreover, since the monitoring by the
18. See Buser et al., supra note 15, at 52.
19. See E. Hirschhom, Developing a Risk-Related Premium Structure for Deposit Insurance, in BANK
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 270-78 (1986); R. B. Avery et al., An Analysis of Risk-Based Deposit
Insurance for Commercial Banks, in BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 217-50 (1985); Edward J. Kane,
A Six-Point Program for Deposit-Insurance Reform, in BANK STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 202-09 (1983).
20. See Mark J. Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank Regulation, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF PHILADELPHIA BUS. REV., Jan./Feb. 1982, at 17; Avery et al., supra note 19; KANE, GATHERING CRISIS,
supra note 14, at 14, 62; Kareken & Wallace, supra note 15.
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insuring agency is not continuous, the sum of the current explicit and implicit
costs is more likely to represent past risks than the present and future risks
borne by the insured.
4. Absence of Built-in Safeguards for the Insurer
Private insurance companies try to control their risk exposure in several
ways. Some of the more common tools that insurance companies employ to
control their risk are: coinsurance, deductibles, risk-based premiums, and upper
limits on the coverage.2 While all of these may not be appropriate for deposit
insurance, it is surprising that none of these features is built into the system of
federal deposit insurance. Under a coinsurance clause, the insured are required
to assume a certain percentage of the loss incurred. In the case of deposit insur-
ance, depositors in a failing depository institution would be unable to recover
100% of their deposit balances. Such a clause will give depositors an incentive
to discipline the risk-taking behavior of their depositories. Such depositor
monitoring would also benefit the insurer by curbing the risk-seeking behavior
of the insured institutions. Under a deductibility clause, depositors will be
responsible up to a stated amount of the loss before the insurer will assume any
responsibility. The deductible may be applied for each loss or for total losses
in a given year. Once again, the intent is to make the depositors exercise some
monitoring of the depository institutions' risk-seeking behavior. Risk-sensitive
premiums will give a direct incentive for the insured institutions either to
reduce their risk or not to increase it. Placing upper bound on the maximum
loss the insurer is prepared to cover will make it possible to impose some
market discipline, since others will have to bear the losses above that limit.
While there are current statutory limits on the maximum coverage per depositor,
there are no stated limits on the insuring agencies' liability in regard to a given
depository institution.
While the above design defects existed from the inception of the federal
deposit insurance program, their adverse consequences did not become acute
until after the deregulation of the industry in the 1980s. The federal deposit
insurance system has remained essentially unchanged during its fifty-five years
of existence, while the industry it insures has become more risky. Since under
the flat rate assessment system all insured institutions pay the same premium
rate per $100 of deposits, irrespective of their individual risk differences, it
became necessary to devise some other means to control the risk assumed by
the depositories. This was done by controlling the permissible activities (separa-
tion of commercial and investment banking, separation of banking and com-
21. See Eugene D. Short & Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Deregulation and Deposit Insurance, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS ECON. REV., Sept. 1983. at 11, 16.
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merce, etc.), by controlling the interest paid on deposits (Regulation.Q ceilings),
and by giving regulators substantial discretionary powers to regulate the indus-
try. Innovations in the market place, globalization of financial markets and other
forces made such a highly regulated system unstable and obsolete."2
After nearly five decades of extensive regulation, the first major step for
deregulating the industry was taken with the enactment of the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980.
Among other things, the legislation provided for the phasing out of interest rate
ceilings and permitted the depository institutions, particularly the thrift industry,
to enter into new and more risky areas of business, such as commercial real
estate lending, issuing of credit cards, etc. The deregulation of the industry
continued under the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.23
In addition, several state governments granted still broader powers to their state-
chartered depository institutions. No attempt was made to contain the loss
exposure of the federal insurance agencies by simultaneous reforms in the
design of the federal deposit insurance system. The rate of assessment was not
raised, the flat rate system of assessments continued, and no safeguards were
built into the system to contain the loss exposure of the insurance funds. On
the contrary, the de jure coverage limit for deposits was raised from $40,000
to $100,000 under the DIDMCA of 1980. The net result of the higher coverage
limit and the new powers granted to the insured institutions was that the risk
exposure of the federal insuring agencies increased substantially.'
B. Defects in the Supervisory and Regulatory Practices
As discussed earlier, defects in the design of the system created a tendency
for risk escalation by the depository institutions. To keep the risk exposure of
the insurance funds under control, the system has mainly relied on de jure limits
on the insurance coverage on the one hand, and regulation and supervision on
the other. The bankruptcy of the FSLIC and the current financial problems of
the BIF represent a massive failure of the system of regulatory monitoring. The
bank examination system has not kept pace with banking practices. The activi-
ties of the depository institutions have expanded under the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), the Garn-St.
22. See CARGILL, supra note 3, at 237-79.
23. For a description of the major provisions of the DIDMCA and the Garn-St.Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, see id. at 283-84, 286-88.
24. Some other factors which contributed to the increased losses were: increased volatility of interest
rates particularly after 1979; increased inflationary pressures and the deregulation of interest rates; de
facto geographic deregulation, entry of nonbanks, and increased competition; economic troubles in states
dependent on agriculture and oil industries; and managerial fraud. For a detailed discussion of these
factors, see Krishna G. Mantripragada, Deposit Insurance: Origins, Problems, and Proposals for Reform
51-58 (Dec. 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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Germain Act of 1982, and powers granted to several state-chartered institutions
by their respective state governments. However, the staffing and training of the
examiners failed to keep pace with the expanding powers of the depository
institutions.
While the insuring agencies enjoyed wide powers to examine and control
the insured institutions, they lacked the power to close insolvent depository
institutions. 25 This power resided with the chartering agency (the Office of
the Comptroller of Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, or the state
banking authorities), not the insurer. Also, the rules for closing insolvent
depository institutions were not based on sound accounting practices. Regulators
used the Regulatory Accounting Principles (RAP) to monitor the net worth
positions of the depository institutions. Depository institutions with zero net
worth were not closed. Instead, they were allowed to continue to operate long
after that point, until the book value of the net worth under the RAP became
zero. 6 In many cases, the institutions were allowed to operate even beyond
that point. This was done under what became known as capital forbearance
programs.27 Capital forbearance meant that regulators would exercise restraint
toward a depository institution and would not issue a capital directive to enforce
the normal capital standards. Nor would a formal administrative action be taken
to enforce capital standards or to take other actions relating to capital adequacy.
By allowing depository institutions to operate with negative or zero net worth
while the deposit insurance coverage was kept intact, the capital forbearance
policies escalated the risks associated with moral hazard.
The insuring agencies' failure resolution methods also contributed to the
erosion of market discipline.28 The federal deposit insurance program started
with an initial coverage limit of $2,500. The limit was raised several times until
in 1980 it was raised from $40,000 to its current de jure limit of $100,000 per
depositor, per account type, per insured institution. By splitting their deposits
among different types of accounts and institutions, large depositors could get
insurance coverage beyond the $100,000 de jure limit. When large depositors
do this with the help of brokers, they are known as brokered deposits. The de
25. See Barbara Bennett, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance: Controlling the FDIC's Losses, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANcIsco EcON. REV., Spring 1984, at 16.
26. While market-value accounting is more useful than book-value accountingfor regulatory purposes,
it is not easy to implement. However, the main point here is that even the less stringent accounting standards
of RAP were compromised under the capital forbearance programs, as the subsequent discussion reveals.
For a full discussion of the issues relating to the implementation of market-value accounting for depository
institutions, see Krishna G. Mantripragada, The Role of Market-Value Accounting in Reducing Potential
Taxpayer Subsidies: The Case of Deposit Insurance, PUB. BUDGETING & FIN., Winter 1991, at 20.
27. See Dean F. Cobos, Forbearance: Practices and Proposed Standards, 2 FDIC BANKING REV. 20
(1989); Capital Forbearance (FDIC March 27, 1986) (mermorandum from L. William Seidman); Amended
Capital Forbearance Guidelines (FDIC July 9, 1987) (memorandum from L. William Seidman); E. Brewer
1M, Full-blown Crisis, Half-measure Cure, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP., Nov./Dec. 1989,
at 2.
28. See KANE, GATHERING CRISIS, supra note 14, at 37-57.
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jure limit is meaningless as long as a depository institution is not officially
declared insolvent, since the uninsured depositors may be withdrawn in full at
any time up to the time of official declaration of insolvency. After a depository
institution is declared insolvent, the losses to the uninsured depositors depend
on how the failure of the institution is resolved. Insurance agencies primarily
relied on a method known as purchase and assumption,29 which protects in
full even the de jure uninsured deposits. This method has been used with
conspicuous regularity for large institutions such as the Continental Illinois
Bank in 1984, First Republic Bank Corporation of Dallas in 1988, and the Bank
of New England in 1990. Thus, the depositors have an entrenched belief in the
continuation of the "too big to fail" policy. This is a policy under which
insurance protection is extended to all deposits (including the uninsured depos-
its) as a part of the supervisory reorganization of an insolvent depository
institution. 30 This is usually done to prevent a run on the bank in question and
on other large banks. One consequence of the "too big to fail" policy has been
the virtual disappearance of depositor monitoring as a check on the risk-
seeking behavior of depository institutions.
Thus, defects in the design of the insurance system and a heavy reliance
on what proved to be inadequate supervisory controls to regulate bank risk have
contributed to heavy losses for both the insuring agencies and taxpayers.
Hence, there has been an active exploration of alternatives for controlling the
risk of depository institutions.
II. Depositor Discipline: Rationale and Methods
Depositor discipline is a potential supplement to the regulatory supervision
of depository institutions. There are two issues that need to be addressed. One,
why are depositors considered a source of disciplining influence on depository
institutions? Two, what are the different methods by which depositor discipline
may be induced?
A. Depositors as a Source of Market Discipline
Depository institutions are financial intermediaries. As such, they issue
several types of liabilities: deposits, debt subordinated to deposits, common and
preferred stock. They invest the funds primarily in two types of assets: market-
able securities and loans. The difference in the interest rate earned on the assets
and the interest rate paid on the liabilities is the interest margin. This is the
basic source of profit for a depository institution. For any business, the risk
29. Id. at 39-49.
30. Richard E. Randall, The Need to Protect Depositors of Large Banks, and the Implications for Bank
Powers and Ownership, FED. RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Sept./Oct. 1990, at 63-75.
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associated with its investments will determine the risk to the suppliers of funds.
The suppliers of funds will attempt to control their risk exposure either by
restricting the risk assumed by the business, or by demanding a rate of return
appropriate to the level of risk underlying the firm's investments. This is what
is usually referred to as market discipline or market control of risk.
Potential sources of such market discipline for depository institutions
include depositors, holders of debt, and holders of preferred and common
stock.3' Only a few depository institutions have debt (subordinated to deposits)
or preferred shares in their capital structure. Common equity constitutes gene-
rally less than 7% of the assets. In a recent study done for the House Banking
Committee, it was reported that between 1981 and 1990, equity finance ranged
between 5.79% and 6.43% for all the insured banks. 32 Depositories organized
as mutuals do not have a separate group of equity shareholders. All funds are
contributed as deposits. Since deposits constitute the bulk of the liabilities of
depository institutions, depositors may be the most logical source of informal
regulation. Moreover, while the depositors stand to lose in the event of a bank
failure, they do not get to share in the extra profit the bank may make by
pursuing a risky strategy. The shareholders, on the other hand, stand to gain
if the risky strategy pays off. Thus the shareholders are not as likely as deposi-
tors to rigidly scrutinize the riskiness of bank asset portfolios. Consequently,
depositors may be the best source of market discipline.
Absent deposit insurance, depositors would be more likely to withdraw their
deposits from an institution either assuming or rumored to be assuming impru-
dent risk-levels. Such actions by depositors can destabilize the banking system
by creating runs on banks. With deposit insurance in place, depositor discipline
works in a less destabilizing way. Deposit insurance breaks the normal link
between the risk of a depository's investments and the risk to its depositors by
shifting asset risk to insurers.
The extent of depositor discipline in a regime of deposit insurance depends
on the extent of protection offered by such insurance. Depositors can be a
source of market discipline even with deposit insurance, provided there are
limits on the insurance coverage. However, only the owners of uninsured
deposits may be expected to do any monitoring. It should be noted that what
is important is the depositors' perception of the de facto limits on deposit
insurance coverage, not the de jure limits.33 The greater the de facto protection
extended to depositors, the weaker the depositor-imposed discipline. Under a
31. BENSTON, ET AL, supra note 11, at 173-79; Robert E. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the Risks
of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 34-40 (1985); Mantripragada, supra note 24, at
96-171.
32. BARTH ETAL., supra note 10, at 20. The numbers would be smaller if computed in terms of market
values.
33. M. O'Hara & W. Shaw, Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to
Fail," J. FiN., 1587-99 (1990).
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de facto 100% coverage of all deposits, the depositor-induced market discipline
will be non-existent.
The justification for deposit insurance is to eliminate the destabilizing
effects of bank runs by reducing the temptation for depositors to pull their
money out of a bank that is merely rumored to be insolvent. Unfortunately,
such insurance, if very generous, provides little incentive for depositors to
monitor a bank that may be pursuing policies risky enough to actually lead it
toward insolvency. As a result of the failure resolution procedures followed by
the insuring agencies, even the uninsured depositors have felt very little need
to monitor their depository institutions.
Therefore, if an incentive can be created for increased depositor monitor-
ing of depository institutions, it can be a good supplement to the monitoring
by the regulators, and can act as a restraint on the risk-taking behavior of
depository institutions thereby reducing the risk exposure to the FDIC. Since
monitoring involves costs to the depositors, they will not monitor without an
incentive. Such an incentive may be created by exposing the uninsured deposi-
tors to potential losses.
B. Methods of Inducing Depositor Discipline
There are several ways to induce depositor discipline, including: applying
deductibles 5; introducing co-insurance36; reducing the dollar limits on
insurance coverage37, capping the benefits per depositor, and strict enforcement
of de jure coverage limits. 38 These proposals represent variations of the same
basic theme - an increase in the potential losses to the depositors and a corre-
sponding reduction in the potential losses to the insurer.
Two ways to limit potential losses to the insurance fund and shift them to
the depositors are instituting deductibles and/or co-insurance. While the intent
of the two is the same, they operate in slightly different ways. In the case of
deductibles, the FDIC would cover the deposits only after the deductible limit
has been met. For example, if the deductible is set at $5,000, a depositor who
34. The incentive which can be created for depositors can only be a negative incentive, in the form
of increased risk of potential losses in case of bank failures.
35. Short & O'Driscoll, supra note 21, at 11-23.
36. See Kane, supra note 19, at 202-09; Short & O'DriscoU, supra note 21, at 11-23; JOHN H. BOYD
& ARTHUR J. ROLNIK, A Case for Reforming Federal Deposit Insurance, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAP-
ous 1988 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1988).
37. See Edward J. Kane, Confronting Incentive Problems in U.S. Deposit Insurance: The Range of
Alternative Solutions, in DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX 97-120 (G.G.
Kaufman & R.C. Kormendi eds., 1986); Short & O'Driscoll, supra note 21, at 11-23; C. England, A
Proposal for Introducing Private Deposit Insurance, in BANk STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 316-37 (1986);
Flannery, supra note 20, at 17-27; James B. Thompson & Walter F. Todd, Rethinking and Living with the
Limits of Bank Regulation, 9 CATO J. 579-600 (1990).
38. See James B. Thompson, Using Market Incentives to Reform Bank Regulation and Federal Deposit
Insurance, 26 FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND ECON. REV. 28-40 (1990).
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had $7,500 in an insolvent depository will be covered by the FDIC for $2,500.
Deductibles, however, are regressive. If small and large depositors have the
same deductible, small depositors will lose a larger proportion of their deposits.
One solution would be to make the deductible a percentage of deposits. In any
case, deductibles have the potential to destabilize the banking system by
creating an incentive for runs since ,depositors would be the first to bear any
losses in an actual insolvency.
Co-insurance, on the other hand, would have the FDIC and the depositors
share losses in some specified proportion, once again up to a stipulated maxi-
mum dollar limit on deposits. For example, in the United Kingdom, the insuring
agency insures only 75% of the first 20,000 pounds sterling (approximately U.S.
$34,500 as of October 18, 1991) of loss and the depositors bear the rest.
McCulloch suggested that insurance coverage be lowered to 90 to 95 cents on
the dollar up to the existing limit.39 Another possibility is to add a graduated
coinsurance after reducing the existing coverage to $10,000.' If co-insurance
is applied only after a 100% coverage up to a modest amount (for example,
$10,000 or $15,000), small depositors would not share the losses at all. This
preserves the goal of protecting the small depositor. It must be noted that a
program with deductibles and/or co-insurance may be more complex for an
average depositor to understand than a program with a simple dollar limit on
coverage.
The basic assumption of many proposals to reduce the existing coverage
limit is that the de jure limit of $100,000 per depositor, per account, per
institution is too generous. In practice, because of the failure resolution policies
followed by the insuring agencies and the informal enforcement of the "too big
to fail" policy, even this limit is seldom enforced. The increase in coverage to
$100,000 in 1980 was a substantial increase in real dollars.4' The increase in
coverage limit did not take place because the depositors were asking for it. Nor
was there an imminent instability that would have been created in the system
had the limit not been raised to the new level. Therefore, the coverage limit
may be lowered to create an incentive for deposit monitoring. A reduction of
coverage to $10,000 would result in coverage that exceeds the arithmetic
average of about $8,000 of all insured deposit accounts in banks and thrifts. 2
This lower limit will be good enough to protect small depositors and, if strictly
enforced, will provide an incentive for the owners of uninsured deposits to
carefully monitor the financial soundjness of their depository institutions. Since
the uninsured depositors can withdraw their.funds in full as long as the institu-
39. See J. Huston McCulloch, Bank Regulation and Deposit Insurance, 59 J. Bus. 84 (1986).
40. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 34; see also Kane, supra note 19, at 202-209; Boyd & Rolnik
supra note 36.
41. William M. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, I
YALE J. ON REG. 195, 205 (1984).
42. See Thompson & Todd, supra note 37, at 595-96; see also Kane, supra note 37, at 110.
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tion is not declared insolvent, the potential deposit drain will act as disciplining
device on the managers of depository institutions.
However, there could be serious political and economic problems involved
with lowering the existing limit of $100,000. Banks, thrifts, and millions of
households have made decisions assuming this coverage would continue.
Furthermore, the potential savings from reduced dollar limits on coverage seem
to be somewhat limited. According to one estimate, only five to six percent of
total deposits in federally-insured depositories are in the range of $40,000 to
$100,000. 43
Reducing insurance limits will only work if such limits are strictly enforced.
Uninsured depositors should not have escape routes. Currently, depositors can
expand their coverage by spreading deposits at the dejure limit between several
institutions. Therefore, some argue that the deposit coverage limit should be
applied to each depositor, irrespective of the number of institutions where the
deposits are held and the number of accounts over which they are distri-
buted."4 Chairman Henry Gonzalez of the House Banking Committee suggest-
ed that it might be reasonable to limit the insurance protection to a maximum
of three accounts per depositor.45
Thus, depositors can become a source of market discipline under a threat
of potential losses. There are different ways in which such a threat can be
created, namely reducing coverage limits and instituting deductibles and co-
insurance. For such methods to work, however, the threats of their enforcement
should be real.
III. Some Issues in Implementing Depositor Discipline
The enthusiasm for depositor discipline as a method of promoting market
discipline is not universal.46 The primary reasons for hesitation are the incon-
clusiveness of the past studies on the subject and various practical problems
in implementing depositor discipline.
A. Is Depositor Discipline the Best Form of Market Discipline?
It has not been established that market discipline by depositors is superior
to other forms of market discipline. Reviewing prior studies on the subject,
43. Bert Ely, Privatizing Depositor Protection: More Feasible Than Ever 4 (May 2, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
44. See Thompson, supra note 38, at 33.
45. Paul Duke, Jr., Gonzalez Proposes Limiting Insurance For Bank Accounts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
1990, at A2.
46. See Ely, supra note 43, at 2-5 ; Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit
Insurance, and Banking Regulation, 59 J. Bus. 55 (1986); Helen A. Garten, Banking on the Market: Relying
on Depositors to Control Bank Risks, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 129 (1986).
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Baer and Brewer47 felt that the evidence of market discipline from uninsured
depositors was either weak or non-existent, although their own study found
some evidence favorable to market discipline by uninsured depositors. Baer and
Brewer were not sure whether to push for market discipline via uninsured
deposits without first assessing the costs and likelihood of runs on the banks
relying on such deposits. 8 After an analysis and comparison of 100% insur-
ance, no deposit insurance, co-insurance49 , and subordinated debentures, Gil-
bert50 concluded that co-insurance was not superior under any combination
of assumptions. If the possibility of bank runs is ruled out, subordinated debt
requirement provides the same degree of market discipline as co-insurance.
Gilbert's analysis of empirical studies on the market discipline potential of
uninsured depositors yielded mixed results. The mixed results obtained by
Gilbert and others are based on past experience, when deposit discipline did
not exist in any meaningful sense. The reason for this may very well be the
difficulties in ensuring the necessary conditions for its success.
B. Practical Problems in Implementing Depositor Discipline
While the idea of depositor discipline may be appealing in theory, there are
several practical problems associated with its implementation. First, it is
difficult to determine the appropriate level of risk to impose on the depositors.
Second, an environment must exist that is conducive to effective depositor
discipline. Finally, there are significant costs involved with depositor monitor-
ing.5
1
1. Determining the Appropriate Level of Risk to Impose on
Depositors
One basic issue germane to all of the proposals to enhance the risk exposure
of depositors is how much risk should be shifted from the FDIC to the unin-
sured depositors. This determination requires the balancing of two opposing
forces. A low coverage limit will create an incentive for increased depositor
monitoring, but has a great potential for wide-spread bank runs and destabiliza-
47. Herbert Baer & Elijah Brewer, Uninsured Deposits as a Source of Market Discipline: Some New
Evidence, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO ECON. PERSP., Sept./Oct., 1986, at 23.
48. Id. at 30.
49. Co-insurance, it may be recalled, is a method of inducing depositor discipline by making depositors
share in the losses associated with bank failures.
50. R. Alton Gilbert, Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Theory and Evidence, 72 FED. RESERVE BANK
OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb. 1990, at 3.
51. See Edward J. Kane, Appearance and Reality in Deposit Insurance: The Case for Reform, 10 J.
BANKING & FIN. 175 (1986) [hereinafter Kane, Appearance and Reality]; Kane, supra note 37, at 97;
Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A Summary of the Theoretical
and Empirical Arguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215 (1988).
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tion of the banking system.52 A generous limit, on the other hand, will ensure
the stability of the banking system, but does not effectively promote depositor
discipline, since it offers minimal incentive for depositor monitoring. Some
appear to have taken the view that a threat of bank runs is a necessary price
to pay for a more effective insurance system. 3 Others would like to avoid
bank runs at any cost, and actually argue for 100% coverage of all deposits
rather than a reduction in the statutory limit.54 Both view points have valid
arguments, however, it is difficult to decisively prove one or the other.
Neither approach can prove its case, because the relative magnitudes
of the alternative costs, as well as the probabilities of incurring them, are
not objectively measurable.... Given our current understanding, the reality
is that any selection of a coverage limit must be uncomfortably arbitrary
and, for any amount of coverage greater than zero but less than 100 percent,
there will be an unavoidable risk (of uncertain proportions) that neither bank
runs nor bank risk-taking is sufficiently contained to preserve stability.
55
2. Conditions Necessary for Effective Depositor Monitoring
An effective depositor monitoring system is one which succeeds in curbing
the risk-escalating behavior of depository institutions without destabilizing the
financial system or leaving the small depositors unprotected. According to
Garten, three conditions must exist for depositor discipline to work effectively:
(1) there must be a group of depositors for whom risk is the primary concern
in choosing a depository; (2) depositors must have access to information to
judge the risks involved; and (3) the discipline imposed by depositors must be
severe enough to be felt by the management of a depository, but not so drastic
as to preclude an opportunity for the management to respond to the concerns
of the depositors.56 Two more conditions may be added: (4) some banks must
be allowed to fail, resulting in losses to depositors; and (5) the banking industry
must be financially healthy and enjoy depositor confidence. The relevance of
52. See Goodman & Shaffer, supra note 14, at 155; Litan, supra note 31, at 35; Loretta J. Mester,
Curing Our Ailing Deposit-Insurance System, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Sept./Oct.
1990, at 13, 18.
53. See Kane, Appearance and Reality, supra note 51, at 175.
54. See Ely, supra note 43, at 1; Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 46, at 55; William E. Gibson, Deposit
Insurance in the United States: Evaluation and Reform, 7 J. FIN. & QUANTrrATIVE ANALYsIs 1575 (1972);
William Field, The Case for Insuring All Bank Deposits, 19 AKRON BUS. & ECON. REV. 30 (1988).
Incidentally, a 100% coverage will place small and large banks on the same footing, since under such policy
"too big to fail" loses much of its operational significance.
55. Frederick S. Carns, Should the $100,000 Deposit Insurance Limit be Changed?, 2 FDIC BANKING
REV. 14 (1989).
56. See Garten, supra note 46, at 131-32.
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these conditions and the problems in ensuring their existence in the U.S. are
discussed below.
Depositors may be classified as core depositors or investor-depositors. For
the core depositors, the primary factors in the choice of a depository are
convenience, value of contacts, etc. The investor-depositors primarily seek the
best monetary returns for their deposits, given the risk level. The core deposi-
tors may not be very sensitive to minor risk (return) differences between
depositories. This may be either because the convenience factor dominates their
choices, or because the costs of monitoring and switching between depositories
are prohibitive, or because they do not have enough information to meaning-
fully assess risk differences. However, even the core depositors become sensi-
tive to sizeable risk differences, but at that point withdrawal of deposits and
a run on the institution will be the consequence. The investor-depositors are
not loyal to any particular depository institution. Therefore, their deposits are
volatile by nature. They are much more sensitive to changes in risks or returns
and, as such, can be a good source of depositor discipline. However, such
investor-depositors, who are most likely to be the de jure uninsured depositors,
are important only to a small number of large banks. Approximately three-
fourths of all uninsured deposits are in 1% of commercial banks, or about 150
of them. 7 In 1990, uninsured deposits accounted for 56% of total deposits at
banks over $10 billion size, while they accounted for only 13% at banks under
$1 billion. 58 Therefore, depositor discipline can be a potential source of disci-
pline only to a very small number of large depository institutions, unless the
insurance coverage limit is drastically reduced from its current level.
Another important condition for an effective system of depositor-imposed
market discipline is the availability of relevant information to depositors on a
timely basis. The job of analyzing the risk of a depository is very complex and
requires detailed information about its operations. Even the federal agencies
have failed to correctly assess the risks of certain institutions. For example, City
Federal Savings Bank, New Jersey's largest savings association, was given a
relatively high rating of "2" when the FDIC examiners visited it in 1988. When
they left, the thrift was insolvent and was taken over by the regulators.59
There are two kinds of information the uninsured depositors need: informa-
tion necessary to judge the probability of a depository's insolvency and infor-
mation to judge the losses to themselves in case of an insolvency. There are
serious questions about the availability of both types of information and its
timeliness.
57. Id. at 138.
58. William R. Keeton, The Treasury Plan for Banking Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ECON. REV., May/June 1991, at 12.
59. See David Wessel & Michael McQueen, White House Damage-Control Teams Struggle to Make
Sure Thrift Bailout Doesn't Sink Bush, WALL ST. J., June 14, 1990, at A16.
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Most of the failures of depositories are due to problems with their loan
portfolios. The seeds for a potential problem are sown long before the problem
becomes obvious. According to one study, the potential for serious problems
typically developed over a period of three to five years before the problems
became visible to outsiders. 60 Thus, by the time depositors detect the problem,
fatal damage has already been done. In order to be effective, depositor disci-
pline must be preventive. It should give management enough time to respond
to the perceived concerns.61 Drastic discipline coning too late is not going
to be effective except in destabilizing the system.62 In the absence of a system-
atic and timely flow of accurate information, depositors may be reacting to
mere rumors about the financial health of a depository institution.
The uninsured depositors also need information relevant to the potential
losses to themselves in the case of a failure. The eventual risk to the uninsured
deposits depends not only on the probability of a depository institution becom-
ing insolvent, but also on some other factors about which information is hard
to obtain ex ante. These other factors include whether or not enough liquidity.
will be supplied by the Federal Reserve to an otherwise solvent institution
experiencing a run, whether the regulators will act decisively to stop the
contagious effect of some bank failures from spreading to other institutions, the
timing of when an institution will be declared insolvent and taken over by the
insurer, and which failure-resolution method will be adopted. These factors are
highly relevant in determining the potential losses and concomitant risk to the
uninsured depositors. Yet, information to assess this risk is usually unavailable
since even the regulators will not have specific answers to these questions. It
takes some time to make a decision on the future viability of a bank experi-
encing depositor discipline in the form of a run. Even more time will be needed
to decide on the method of failure resolution, if the institution is declared insol-
vent. It is difficult to resolve these uncertainties to depositors unless some
clearly-specified closure rules are strictly followed.
The third condition necessary to ensure effective depositor discipline is that
the discipline imposed by depositors must be severe enough to be felt by the
management of a depository, but not so drastic as to preclude an opportunity
for the management to respond to the concerns of the depositors. This condition
is intimately related to the availability of timely and relevant information to
depositors. Trying to institute depository discipline with incomplete, inadequate,
or inaccurate information available to depositors has a serious potential for
60. Richard E. Randall, Can the Market Evaluate Asset Quality Exposure in Banks?, FED. RESERVE
OF BOSTON NEW ENG. ECON. REv., July/Aug. 1989, at 3.
61. Some argue that depositors are a poor source of discipline, since they have little effective power
to discipline the management. They can withdraw their deposits but, unlike shareholders, they lack. the
power to remove the management or alter its policies. See Peter J. Wallison, Privatize Deposit Insurance,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1990, at A14.
62. See Garten, supra note 46, at 153.
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destabilizing the system by causing bank runs. Ideally, rational depositors
should investigate a rumor before reacting to it. However, they will not do so
unless they have reason to believe that other depositors will also act rationally.
For depositor-imposed discipline to work there must be symmetric or reciprocal
rationality. Every depositor must act on the assumption that all other depositors
will also be acting rationally. Unfortunately, reciprocal rationality is not proba-
ble because the size of a depositor's loss does not depend on whether he acted
rationally or not, but only on whether he acted in time or not. Depositors can
reduce their loss if they act before other depositors have withdrawn their
deposits.
Releasing more information to depositors so that they can effectively
monitor the risk of depository institutions involves several thorny questions
about who will release what kind of information about depositories, when, and
to whom. What happens if the information falls into the hands of their competi-
tors? What about the potentially destabilizing effects of overreaction to adverse
information? Do all depositors have the necessary sophistication to monitor
effectively, when the more sophisticated public regulators with access to a
greater amount of information have not had great success in this regard?6 3
A system of depositor discipline on paper is useless without practical
enforcement. For an effective system of depositor discipline to take root, some
banks must be allowed to fail and depositors must be made to incur losses. This
requires regulatory resolve because, as the system of depositor discipline starts
to take effect and some banks are allowed to fail, the potential for bank runs
will increase. In order for it to work fairly,. depositor discipline also calls for
the abandonment of the policy of "too big to fail."'  Without such a change,
depositor discipline will be tilted unfairly against small banks, which may be
"too small to save." However, it may be difficult to abandon the "too big to
fail" policy if we wish to protect the availability of short-term credit, stability
of the payments system, and the transmission of liquidity through the econ-
omy.65
Depositor discipline is a new idea to depositors. The potential for destabili-
zing effects on the banking system is low when public confidence in the
banking system is high. Unfortunately, given the adverse publicity surrounding
the financial health of the FDIC insurance funds and the health of the banking
63. It is not the intent here to suggest that the gathering of such information by depositors is impossi-
ble, and therefore depositor discipline is not feasible. The point is that when information needs to be
gathered and processed, there are costs to be incurred in the process. If these costs are high, depositors
try to explore the ways to avoid incurring them, if there are ways to do so. 'However, if the regulators are
committed to the idea of depositor discipline, they can lower such monitoring costs by providing for
adequate and smooth flow of relevant information. The costs of depositor monitoring are discussed further
in the next section.
64. See Tom Hoenig, A Look at Deposit Insurance Reform, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
INSIGHT, Aug. 1990.
65. See Randall, supra note 30, at 69.
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industry, public confidence in the insurance system is currently maintained only
because of the federal government guarantee of insured deposits, and the "too
big to fail" policy. Trying to shift some of the risks to uninsured deposits at
present does have the potential for unforeseen panics. Perhaps the transition to
a system with somewhat greater degree of depositor discipline will be less
disruptive when the financial health of banking system has been restored and
the public confidence has returned.
3. Costs of Depositor Monitoring
Depositor monitoring involves both explicit and implicit costs. The explicit
costs are the out-of-pocket costs incurred by depositors in monitoring the
depository institutions. If depositor monitoring is to play a supplementary role
to government regulation and supervision, as most suggest, the costs incurred
by depositors will be in addition to the costs of regulatory supervision. The total
costs of monitoring, when done by so many depositors in addition to the
regulatory agencies, are bound to increase considerably. Such costs are likely
to be substantial in the U.S. where there are a large number of depository
institutions.66 The implicit costs of such a system include the time depositors
or their agents will need to spend monitoring the depository institutions. There
are opportunity costs associated with this time which include foregone income
in other productive occupations or foregone leisure. There are costs to the
society as well. The most important social cost is the potential destabilizing
effect that bank runs, associated with increased depositor monitoring, will have
on the banking system. When all these costs are calculated, it may be that
depositor monitoring is not cost-effective to society.
For some depositors, it may be easier and more cost-effective to transfer
deposits to financially sound or big depositories than to monitor small, marginal
institutions. This is due to the belief that large depositories will not be allowed
by the government to fail; they are simply "too big to fail." Moving toward
greater depositor discipline while continuing the policy of "too big to fail" will
give large banks an advantage at the expense of small and medium-sized banks.
Naturally, small, independent banks should be expected to oppose such a policy.
They have offices in every congressional district and consequently wield
substantial political clout.
IV. The FDICIA and Depositor Discipline
66. There were approximately 2,700 federally insured thrift institutions, 12,500 federally insured
commercial banks, and 13,300 federally insured credit unions in the U.S. in June 1990. By way of
comparison, Canada had less than a dozen commercial banks.
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The above discussion reveals that there are some practical problems in
implementing an effective system of depositor discipline. While many of the
key problems remain to be resolved, the Department of the Treasury has come
out in favor of an increased role for depositor discipline, and the recently-
enacted Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 199167
(FDICIA) has incorporated some of the Treasury's proposals. A presentation
of these provisions and their assessment follows.
A. Provisions of the FDICIA for Promoting Depositor Discipline
The Treasury report identified over-extension of deposit insurance as one
of the problems facing the federal deposit insurance program. It called for an
increased role for depositor discipline in reducing the risk exposure of the
FDIC, and made the following specific proposals in this regard68: (1) In the
short-run (with a two-year transition), a depositor should be limited to two
insured accounts-one for an individual account and one for a retirement
account-with a coverage limit of $100,000 for each account, per institution. In
the long-run (over a five-year period), the goal should be to apply the $100,000
limit on a system-wide basis, after the FDIC has completed a cost-benefit study.
(2) Elimination of the coverage of brokered deposits and non-deposit creditors,
and pass-through coverage for institutional investors like pension funds and for
bank investment contracts. (3) Limiting the coverage of uninsured deposits by
requiring the FDIC to adopt the least costly resolution method. The report did
not call for the abandonment of the "too big to fail" policy, but for a restricted
application of it. In those cases where the uninsured deposits also may have
to be protected to contain the systemic risk, the decision should be made jointly
by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The extra cost incurred in protecting
the uninsured deposits in such cases should be advanced to the FDIC by the
Federal Reserve, with the FDIC repaying the advance with (banking) industry
funds. A three-year phase-in period for the change in the current de facto policy
of protecting all uninsured deposits was recommended.
The FDICIA has incorporated many of the Treasury's proposals, which are
described below.
1. Least-Cost Resolution Method
67. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L No. 102.242, 105
Stat.2236, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) [hereidafter FDICIAJ.
68. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at xiii-xiv, 16-31. In addition to the proposals
described here, the Report recommends implementation of risk-based insurance premiums, capital-based
regulation, feasibility studies of private reinsurance, common ownership between banks and industrial.and
commercial concerns, and securities powers for banking organizations. While these are relevant for
modernizing the banking system and improving the federal deposit insurance system and regulation, some
of them are not directly relevant to the idea of depositor monitoring and will not be examined here.
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The FDICIA generally requires the FDIC to adopt the least costly of all the
possible methods of resolution for each failed or insolvent depository institu-
tion. 9 The Treasury report criticized the FDIC for routinely choosing the
purchase and assumption method in most cases.7" Such a practice may not be
the least costly of all methods and has historically resulted in the FDIC extend-
ing protection to uninsured depositors as well. In some cases, the purchase and
assumption method, which precludes losses to uninsured depositors, may in fact
be the least costly method; however, there are many other cases where another
method, known as "insured deposit transfer", which does not require the FDIC
to protect the uninsured depositors, may be cheaper. In the past, the FDIC
usually chose the less costly of these two alternatives. The FDIC would either
liquidate the depository institution and pay off only the insured depositors or
employ the purchase and assumption method which extended protection to
uninsured depositors. However, neither of these options necessarily represented
the least costly of all the alternatives in each case.
The requirement that the FDIC adopt the least costly method of resolution
will result in more losses to the uninsured depositors than in the past, except
in those cases where protecting the uninsured depositors also happens to be the
least expensive method of resolution of a failed institution.
2. Prohibition of Insurance Protection to Uninsured
Depositors and Creditors
The FDICIA generally prohibits the FDIC from making payments to
uninsured depositors and the creditors. "The Corporation may not take any
action, directly or indirectly, with respect to any insured depository institution
that would have the effect of increasing losses to any insurance fund by protect-
ing: (I) depositors for more than the insured portion of deposits (determined
without regard to whether such institution is liquidated); or (II) creditors other
than depositors."'" This provision comes into force after December 31, 1994,
or earlier as the FDIC may deem appropriate. The FDIC is required to prescribe
regulations pertaining to the implementation of this policy no later than January
1, 1994 and the regulations shall take effect no later than January 1, 1995.
The curtailment of the ability of the FDIC to routinely extend its insurance
protection to uninsured depositors will increase the risk to uninsured depositors
and should lead to greater depositor discipline.
69. See FDICIA § 141.
70. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 12, at 26-27; see also KANE, GATHERING CRISIS,
supra note 14, at 45-46.
71. See FDICIA § 141 (E).
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3. Tighter Scrutiny of Too Big to Fail
While the effect of the two provisions discussed above is the prevention
of overextension of deposit insurance, the Act does retain some flexibility and
regulatory discretion. Exceptions may be made to the application of the least
cost resolution requirement and the prohibition of payments to uninsured
depositors and other creditors, if the compliance with those requirements would
have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial stability, and
if some other action or assistance would mitigate such adverse effects.72 The
Secretary of the Treasury, upon the written recommendations from the Board
of Directors of the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, determines the exceptions to be made to the general policy. The costs
to the FDIC of such assistance shall be recovered from one or more emergency
special assessments on the members of the insurance fund in question.73
Thus the Act retains the "too big to fail" policy, but attempts to curtail its
scope. The owners of uninsured deposits should no longer expect a routine
extension of federal deposit insurance protection. Consequently, the risk to
uninsured depositors increases substantially.
4. Changes in the Scope of Deposit Insurance Coverage
The Act reduces the scope of deposit insurance coverage. The net amount
due to any depositor at an insured depository institution is limited to atotal of
$100,000, excluding any amount in a trust fund.74 In addition, a separate
coverage of up to $100,000 per participant per insured depository institution
is available for retirement accounts.75
Since the de jure limit is applicable at each insured depository institution,
it is still possible for a depositor to spread his deposits at several insured
institutions and get coverage several times the $100,000 limit.76 However, the
ability of weaker depository institutions to attract brokered deposits is restricted
by the Act. The Act requires the regulatory agencies to establish five levels of
capitalization, from well-capitalized to critically undercapitalized." A deposi-
tory institution that is considered undercapitalized is prohibited from soliciting
72. See FDICIA § 141(G)(i).
73. See FDICIA § 141(G)(ii).
74. See FDICIA § 311(b)(1).
75. See FDICIA § 311(b)(3).
76. However, the FDIC is required to make an informational study of tht cost and feasibility of tracking
the insured and uninsured deposits at all insured institutions, in order to investigate the feasibility of
extending the $100,000 limit on a system-wide basis. The report of the FDIC's study is to be submitted
to the Congress before the end of the 18-month period beginning on the date of enactment of the Act. See
FDICIA § 311(d).
77. See FDICIA § 131. The five categories consist of: well capitalized, adequately capitalized,
undercapitalized, significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapitalized.
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deposits by offering rates of interest significantly higher than the prevailing
interest rates on insured deposits "...in (1) such institution's normal market
areas or (2) in the market area in which such deposits would otherwise be
accepted."78
The Act retains the insurance coverage to participants or beneficiaries in
employee-benefit plans on a more restrictive pro rata or pass-through basis.
Effective one year after the passage of the Act, the FDIC shall not provide
insurance to such deposits at insured institutions which, at the time such
deposits are accepted, are prohibited from accepting brokered deposits.79
B. FDICIA and Depositor Discipline: An Assessment
The Treasury report and the FDICIA have in effect rejected the idea of
reducing the existing de jure coverage limit of $100,000.80 This may be a
recognition of the political reality regarding the chances for such reduction.
Instead of trying to promote depositor discipline via a reduction of the dollar
coverage limit, the Act attempts to do it through the following measures:
reducing the number of insured accounts, restricting coverage of the brokered
deposits and the pass-through accounts held by institutional investors, and
requiring the FDIC to adopt the least cost method of resolution. The idea of
a mandatory 100% coverage of all deposits is rejected, but the door is left open
to that possibility on a case-by-case basis.
The main intent of these provisions is to decrease the risk to the FDIC's
insurance funds and increase the risk to the uninsured deposits. The policy
seems to be heavily influenced by the desire to reduce the loss exposure of the
FDIC and the taxpayers. However, the situation does not necessarily have to
develop into a zero-sum game. A reduced risk to the FDIC does not have to
come at the cost of increased risk to uninsured depositors. It is possible that
the overall risk of the banking system may decrease if some of the other
provisions of the FDICIA work well. The FDICIA does not shift the entire
burden of monitoring the risk of depository institutions to the uninsured deposi-
tors. It has other provisions designed to enable the regulators to better monitor
and regulate the risk to the FDIC insurance funds. These are briefly described
below."'
The Act links the degree of regulatory supervision to the level of a deposi-
tory's capital. As capital levels start falling below the minimum acceptable level
set by the appropriate federal banking agency, progressively more severe and
78. See FD1CIA § 301(c).
79. See FDICIA § 311(b).
80. For a detailed critique of the Treasury proposals, see Keeton, supra note 58, at 5-24. See also
Edward J. Kane, Dissecting Current Legislative Proposals for Deposit Insurance Reform, in BANK
STRUCTURE AND COMPETITION 126-35 (1991).
81. A full discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope of this paper.
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prompt supervisory intervention is imposed.82 The regulatory agencies are also
required to fix a leverage limit (ratio of tangible equity to total assets) at which
an insured depository becomes critically undercapitalized. The limit shall not
be less than 2 percent of total assets. 3 Within 90 days of an insured depos-
itory becoming critically undercapitalized, the appropriate federal banking
agency must appoint a receiver for the institution, unless the agency, with the
concurrence of the FDIC, takes some other appropriate action. Subject to some
exceptions, the agency, however, shall appoint a receiver if such a depository
is critically undercapitalized on average during the calendar quarter beginning
270 days after the date on which the institution became undercapitalized.
Annual full-scope, on-site examinations of all insured institutions are
required.85 The Act places some restrictions on the ability of the Federal
Reserve System to advance funds to undercapitalized and critically undercapital-
ized depository institutions. 6 This restriction becomes effective after two years
from the date of enactment. The FDIC is also required to establish a risk-based
premium assessment system in place of the current flat rate premium system.8 7
This system must be in place by no later than July 1, 1993.
It is difficult at this time to estimate the net effect of provisions that
increase risk to uninsured deposits and provisions that attempt to reduce risk
of bank failures by improving regulatory effectiveness. Since different sections
of the Act will become effective on different future dates, the full impact of
the FDICIA on depositor monitoring will not be felt until all the provisions
become fully operational and until a few bank failures involving uninsured
depositors have been encountered. If the provisions of the Act work effectively
in curtailing the banking system's risk, the number of potential bank failures
and the risks to insurance funds and uninsured depositors will be reduced. This
would reduce the need for depositor monitoring. If the provisions do not
improve the regulatory effectiveness in controlling bank risk, the FDIC's risk
will simply be shifted to depositors. It is unclear whether increased depositor
risk will lead to more effective depositor discipline.
There is no guarantee that depositor monitoring under FDICIA will be
orderly, efficient or effective. It is risky to assume that things will necessarily
work the way the Congress and regulators have envisioned. Particularly trou-
bling is the fact that there is no systematic plan to ensure that the conditions
for effective depositor monitoring will develop between now and the time when
the FDICIA provisions will become operational. There is no plan to create a
82. See FDICIA § 131. These provisions are to become effective one year after the enactment of the
Act.
83. See FDICIA § 131(c)(3)(A).
84. See FDICIA § 131(h)(3)(C).
85. See FDICIA § 111.
86. See FDICIA § 142(b).
87. See FDICIA § 302.
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class of investor-depositors who are expected to be more sensitive to risk
differences between depositories; all uninsured depositors are automatically
assumed to be risk-sensitive investor-depositors.
The informational needs of the uninsured depositors are not adequately
addressed by the FDICIA. As discussed earlier, one of the preconditions for
effective depositor monitoring is the timely availability of detailed and sensitive
information. Depositor monitoring will become even more complex and burden-
some if the Treasury's recommendations to broaden the permissible activities
of banking organizations and to permit cross-ownership between banks and
industrial organizations88 are enacted into law. Further, there is no guarantee
that the depositor discipline sought by the FDICIA will apply timely and correct
pressure on the managements of depository institutions without destabilizing
the system.
Also, as mentioned above, some depositories must be allowed to fail and
uninsured depositors must be allowed to incur losses before depositor discipline
can take root. Regulatory resolve to let some large depositories fail is question-
able. The best time to usher in the system of depositor discipline without
excessive disruption of depositor confidence is when the banking system is
financially sound. There is an implicit assumption on the part of Congress and
the regulators that by the end of the transition period provided by the FDICIA,
the banking system will be in good financial health. This may not materialize.
The question surrounding the "too big to fail" policy is more ambiguous.
Until now, uninsured depositors could assume that they would be protected as
a matter of course in large bank failures. Under the FDICIA, the Secretary of
the Treasury will decide whether a failing bank should come under the "too
big to fail" policy, after a recommendation to that effect by -the Board of
Directors of the FDIC and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. The
policy injects new ambiguity by politicizing the decision to extend insurance
protection to those other than insured depositors. The idea behind the policy
is that if the uninsured depositors are not given unconditional guarantees, they
will be forced to monitor the depository institutions more carefully. However,
ambiguity in this respect would almost invite bank runs, since the uninsured
depositors would prefer to be safe rather than rational.
There is also a notable inconsistency in the FDICIA policy. The Act
prescribes that exceptions to the policy of not protecting the uninsured deposi-
tors should be made by the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the written recom-
mendation of the FDIC Board and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve. Yet, the costs of such decisions are to be recovered from the industry
in one or more special assessments. As explained previously, if the FDIC, the
Fed, and the Treasury decide that uninsured depositors of an insured depository
88. These recommendations were not accepted by Congress.
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need to be protected for systemic reasons, some of the benefits from such
policy accrue to society. The costs associated with preserving the systemic
benefits should not be shifted to the industry. Instead, either the Treasury or
the Federal Reserve representing the taxpayers ought to bear such costs.
Keeton argues that the idea of limiting the protection of uninsured deposits
only to those cases where failure to do so would disrupt the entire banking
system, through chain reactions or the so-called contagion effect, is not neces-
sarily sound. Such a view ignores "an even more important source of financial
instability than spillover effects - a general loss of confidence by all uninsured
depositors."89 Abandonment of "too big to fail" as a general policy, with
exceptions limited only to failures with implications of systemic instability,
increases the risk to uninsured depositors. It is incorrect to assume that this can
be accomplished without adverse consequences. Uninsured deposits would flow
to the largest banks or they would flow out of the banking system altogether.
it is unlikely that the new, restricted "too big to fail" policy will let some
of the largest depositories fail, no matter how restrictively the policy is inter-
preted. Therefore, uninsured depositors may engage in a flight to safety. This
flight would cause a serious and disruptive flow of uninsured deposits from
small and intermediate banks to very large banks and would lead to a still
greater concentration of uninsured deposits at large depositories. This would
occur more easily under the Treasury's proposal to permit full interstate
banking. In the extreme case, such a flight to safety may cause all uninsured
deposits to end up with the largest banks which will not be allowed to fail, no
matter how narrowly the "too big to fail" policy is promised to be interpreted.
Since losses to the FDIC in cases involving very large depositories are likely
2to be large, it is doubtful if all such costs can be passed on to the industry in
the form of higher premium assessments without seriously damaging the
financial health of the industry. Hence, the FDIC or the taxpayers may have
to absorb such losses. The net (unintended) effect of the new policy could be
merely a shift of deposits from small and intermediate banks to very large
banks without any reduction in the FDIC's overall risk exposure.
Another possible effect of the new policy is a shift of some uninsured
deposits away from the banking system altogether. If there is no protection of
implicit FDIC insurance, one of the major incentives for uninsured deposits to
stay within the banking system will be lost. Some of the uninsured deposits
may flow into money market mutual funds. Unencumbered by deposit insurance
premiums and reserve requirements, such institutions will be able to offer a
higher rate of return than the banks. Any such substantial flow of deposits away
from the banking system will reduce the Federal Reserve's control over money
supply and credit, with profound effects for the entire national economy.
89. See Keeton, supra note 58, at 11.
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Apart from the argument that promoting depositor discipline by introducing
some uncertainty into the "too big to fail" policy may have the above unin-
tended adverse consequences, Kane finds the Treasury's proposals seriously
deficient in that they do not address the major problem of defective political
and bureaucratic accountability.9" Under the proposals, regulators will continue
to retain the discretion to extend "unlimited insurance coverage after the fact
to formally uninsured obligations of a failing client."'" Moreover, there is no
guarantee that the discretion given will always be exercised in the best. possible
interests of the taxpayers.
Taxpayers must reward rather than punish whistleblowers and ask
politicians and deposit-insurance officials to surrender discretion they
now enjoy with respect to the information they choose to report and the
forbearances they choose to give.92
What Kane finds particularly troubling is how such discretion was routinely
abused in the past with massive financial consequences to the taxpayers.
[T]here exists a systematic anesthetization of official consciences to the
moral dimensions of the tradeoffs that political pressures leads them [the
officials] to foist on the underinformed taxpayers.93
The Treasury proposals and the FDICIA do not give adequate attention to
the issue of protecting money stock or providing safe transaction assets to the
economy. The official measures of money supply (whether Ml, M2, or M3)
include the total amounts in the specified categories of deposits, not just the
insured portions of such deposits.94 In fact, M3 explicitly includes large-
denomination time deposits (defined as those in amounts of $100,000 or more)
which are clearly above the de jure limit of $100,000. When a depository is
allowed to fail and uninsured depositors are not protected, the money supply
shrinks for reasons unrelated to monetary policy.
It is difficult to project the net impact of the provisions of the FDICIA.
Some provisions increase the risk to uninsured depositors; others reduce the
potential number of failures. Many provisions of the Act will not become
effective until some future date. The Act does not have any provisions to ensure
that a system of effective depositor discipline will develop. The major factors
90. See Kane, supra note 80, at 126-35.
91. Id. at 132.
92. Id. at 128.
93. Id. at 129.
94. There is an exception in regard to one item included in M2-the small-denomination time deposits
(defined as those in amounts less than $100,000). By definition, all such deposits are under the de jure
limit.
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which have shaped the reforms seem to be the goals of protecting small deposi-
tors and minimizing losses to the FDIC or the taxpayers. The goals of protect-
ing the money supply and providing a safe transaction asset in the economy
do not appear to have received adequate attention.
V. Maturity-Based Insurance Coverage: An Alternative
There is an alternative method of reducing the scope of the federal deposit
insurance system. This alternative will not only protect small depositors and
reduce the exposure of the FDIC's insurance fund, but will also protect the
money supply and decrease the likelihood of bank runs. The alternative is
important to consider in view of the fact that the FDICIA requires the FDIC
to study the feasibility of authorizing insured depository institutions to offer
both insured and uninsured deposit accounts.95 While the Act does not suggest
the basis on which such segregation should be made, it does ask the FDIC to
consider the following factors: (1) the risk such a system would pose to the
deposit insurance system; (2) the disclosure standards which would be necessary
to prevent customer confusion over the insured status of the deposits; (3) the
required revisions or changes in the accounting standards; and (4) the manner
in which the system can be implemented with least disruption to general
stability and banking consumers' confidence. The FDIC is required to submit
a report to the Congress before the end of six months from the date of enact-
ment of the Act.
The alternative that should be considered seriously is to set insurance
coverage limits in terms of the maturity of the deposits rather than to set dollar
limits for coverage of all types of deposits.96 Under such a policy, deposit
insurance will essentially be extended to all short-term or transaction deposits,
since these are the closest alternatives to currency. The assets which may be
acquired with such insured deposits may have to be carefully specified. Besides
containing the FDIC's risk exposure and protecting the small depositor, such
a policy would satisfy the objective of protecting the money supply from
serious fluctuations arising from bank runs and failures. Deposits of longer
maturities are actually financial investments and the government should not
insure those investments, just as it does not insure other types of depositors'
investments such as stocks, bonds, automobiles, or houses. Retirement account
insurance may be shifted to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
Maturity-based coverage will make the depositors recognize an important
95. See FDICIA § 321.
96. See F.T. Furlong, A View on Deposit Insurance Coverage, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
ECON. REV., Spring 1984, at 36; Mark J. Flannery & Aris A. Protopapadakis, Risk-Sensitive Deposit
Insurance Premia: Some Practical Issues, FED. RESERVE BANK PHILADELPHIA Bus. REV., Sept./Oct. 1984,
at 9; Cams, supra note 55, at 14-15.
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financial principle--if they want higher returns they will have to sacrifice some
liquidity and safety provided by deposit insurance.
The maturity-based coverage is also more flexible than the coverage based
on a dollar limit. Under the dollar-limit system all depositors are given the same
protection whether they want it or not. All depositors are exposed to losses in
the same way once the coverage limit, which is arbitrarily set, is reached. Even
if some of the depositors desire a larger amount of protection than the specified
coverage limit, and are willing to sacrifice a higher return for such safety, it
is difficult for them to get it under the present system. Under the maturity-based
system depositors can seek greater safety for more of their deposits by shifting
them into the insured, short-term maturities. This will involve a lower return,
but depositors will have a choice. Those who wish to seek higher returns
without the insurance protection can choose to keep a large portion of their
deposits in the longer uninsured maturity ranges. The maturity-based coverage
also makes it easier to identify depositors as core depositors or investor-deposi-
tors. Under the system, depositors self-select whether they will be uninsured
depositors by choosing a maturity range. This will provide for better depositor
monitoring than the dollar-limit system, which assumes that any depositor with
more than $100,000 in his account is an investor-depositor. The maturity-based
coverage will also eliminate the disadvantage of the smaller banks vis-a-vis the
larger ones, since there will a 100% coverage for all deposits within the
specified maturity limit.
The potential for destabilizing bank runs will also be reduced under the
maturity-based coverage. The short-maturity deposits will be fully insured and
their owners will not have to be concerned about the safety of their funds. The
owners of uninsured, longer-term deposits have to be concerned about the
financial safety of their depositories, but they cannot start a run because their
funds will not be payable at par on demand. Hence, they or their agents will
be forced to monitor their depositories more carefully.
Maturity based deposit insurance could heighten the traditional maturity
mismatch problem of depositories, creating a further source of instability in the
banking system. A dynamic and innovative financial system should, however,
find a solution. For example, depository institutions may offer higher returns
on the uninsured, longer-term deposits to reduce their own maturity mismatch
problems.
A practical problem with setting coverage limits by the maturity of deposits
is deciding what maturity limit should be chosen for coverage. Any choice of
a maturity limit could be as arbitrary as the current dollar-size limit. One logical
solution is to limit the protection only to those liabilities of depository institu-
tions which are included in the official definition of money supply (MI or M2)
and to exclude others. This will serve the additional objectives of protecting
the money supply and providing a safe transaction asset for the economy. This
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approach will not be effective, however, if depositors are led to believe that
there will be a de facto guarantee of deposits of all maturities, whatever the
formal rules may be.
More important than fixing the limits to coverage is the willingness to
enforce these limits. Many of the past problems of the FSLIC and the FDIC
arose not because of the absence of coverage limits, but because of the unwill-
ingness to enforce the ones which existed. Liberal interpretation of the coverage
limits and frequent and generous exemptions to the stated limits work against
attempts to encourage depositor discipline. While a significant amount of
evidence is not yet available to judge how serious the regulators are about
enforcing the provisions of the FDICIA, there is already some criticism in this
regard. Macey has argued that the way the FDIC has handled the recent cases
of CrossLand Savings, FSB, and Brooklyn appears inconsistent with the
provisions of the FDICIA.97 In this case, the FDIC decided to take over the
institution after turning down two outside bids. Macey argues that the FDIC
plan looks like the 1984 government takeover of the Continental Illinois Bank,
and that, contrary to the intent of the FDICIA, it appears to violate the least-
cost resolution requirement, and is an example of a dramatic extension of the
"too big to fail" policy. Macey is particularly disturbed by the fact that, unlike
the Continental Bank, CrossLand is a medium-sized bank, and unlike the
Continental case there were private bidders available.
In the ultimate analysis, depositors as a group have enormous political clout
and can always successfully pressure Congress to bail them out when their
losses threaten to become substantial. As long as the legislators are inclined to
pay attention to their voters, it is easier for depositors to try to influence their
legislators than to monitor the health of depository institutions. As Ely points
out, the political process "understandably and yet undesirably tilts towards
economic losers."98 The losers and prospective losers in the financial system
may never have to pay the full price of their action or inaction. This possibility
alone seriously undermines the potential usefulness of any system of depositor
discipline, whether enforced with dollar-based or maturity-based coverage
limits.
Conclusion
The case for depositor discipline is fairly compelling on paper. Most of the
problems with depositor discipline are in designing a workable system for
implementing it. For an effective system of depositor discipline, certain precon-
ditions are necessary. First, there must exist a class of risk sensitive depositors
97. See Jonathan R. Macey, Needless Nationalization at the FDIC, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14,1992, at A10.
98. Ely, supra note 43, at 5.
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who are given timely and relevant information. Second, any depositor discipline
system must be structured to protect the stability of the banking system and
prevent severe fluctuations in the money supply. Third, there must be regulatory
resolve to enforce the system and allow uninsured depositors to suffer losses.
Fourth, the system must not unfairly discriminate against small institutions.
Finally, and most importantly, the banking system must be returned to financial
health and public confidence restored before any depositor discipline system
can be implemented. The Treasury proposals and the provisions of the FDICIA
do not address these issues in any meaningful way. They provide a transition
period, but there is no systematic plan to improve the conditions conducive to
depositor discipline.
